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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO . 
LERAJJARENRA-O-KEL-L Y, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
) 




Defendant and Respondent. 
. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT . 
On appeal from the District Court of 
the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Ada, Judise Richard Greenwood, Presiding 
ORAL ARGUMEJ'JT REQUESTED 
APPEARANCES: 
William Loomis 
Deputy Attorney General 
1299 North Orchard Ste. 110 
Boise, Idaho 83 706 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT 
LERAJJAREANRA-O-KEL-L Y 
ill 
195 North Higbee Ave. 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the District Court Abuse it's Discretion and/or err granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment? 
2. Was the punishment resulting from Appellant's finding of guilt on his Disciplinary 
Offense Reports, atypical and significant? 
i . 
~ 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
As Appellant attest within his Declaration makes clear, as a proximate cause of his sexual preference, 
being bi-sexual and exercising his rights under the First Amendment IDOC prison officials, acting pursuant to a 
custom or policy, engaged in a ongoing persistent pattern of retaliatory and discriminatory misconduct toward him , 
connected to Predatory Classifying him, inflicting continual injuries upon him spanning back to 2003 while he was 
incarcerated within the IDOC system. Fearing fearing retaliation from prison employees, although Appellant 
exhausted his administrative remedies challenging a retalitorially falsely tailored predatorial sexual activity 
Disciplinary Offense Report (DOR), the denial of due process connected thereto and challenging the unlawful, 
improper Predatorial Classification directly stemming from such conduct, he did not file action against prison 
officials for thier conduct in 2003 and 2004. From said period, as the below discussed illustrate, IDOC prison 
officials from that adverse conduct retaliated against him further by reimposing the Predatorial Classification, 
imposing a Predatory Alert Classification, denying him due process connected to his 2006 DOR's and 
Administrative Segregation (AS) proceedings resulting in his unlawful and improper designation and validation 
under those classifications by prison officials for five ( 5) years which IDOC Defendants refused to correct, resulting 
in his unlawful and improper placement and retention in AS inflicting atypical and significant hardship upon him. 
While incarcerated within the IDOC, his father (Lavon Roberts) past away in 200 l, leaving him with an 
inheritance of around $24,000.00 to which he received in 2001 or 2002 while incarcerated at the IdahoCorrectional 
Center (ICC). During the time periods of 200 l through 2004, he retained a large portion of that inheritance on his 
inmate account when he became acquaintance with inmates Michael Swanson, Jesse Woodruff, Cody Lujan, and 
Israel DwYer who were aware his large inmate account balance as were interested in earning or acquiring some of 
Appelant's money, including through extortion. On or about January 15, 2003, while incarcerated at the Idaho 
Correction Center (ICC), Appellant reported that inmate Michael Swanson and one other inmate (whose true full 
name is unknown to Appellant at this time (who worked for Keefe within the ICC institution in a warehouse packing 
commissary for inmates and in that work capacity was able to view inmate's account balance on Keefe commissary 
order forms and through such discovered Appellant's account balance) was extorting money from him. Inmate 
Swanson advised Appellant that if he didn't pay him money he would report that he had sexually assaulted him and 
that no one would believe him (Appellant), because he (Appellant) was a sex offender Inmate Swanson during the 
course of that investigation reported that Appellant had engaged in sexual activity with him in exchange for 
property, sexually pressured him. Appellant recieved no DOR connected to said incident and subsequently was 
transferred to the Idaho Security Correctional Institution (ISCI) where he met inmates Woodruff, Lujan and Dwyer. 
Shortly after Appellant's move to Unit 11 ofISCI, Defendant Sgt Latullipe spoke to Appellant about Mr. Swanson's 
allegation and expressed in a negative vindictive tone during that conversation that he felt that the ICC officials did a 
poor investigation , that Appellant should have been issued a disciplinary offense connected to such, felt the 
Appellant was a predator and that he was going to check into the matter further and would be watching the 
Appellant. Cody Lujan, three (3) years later on March 1, 2006, prepared and signed a Declaration under penalty 
of perjury in support of Appellant , stating to the effect, that between April and May 2003, he was falsely 
implicated by another inmate (Jesse Woodruff) of performing sexual activity with Plaintiff, that he adamantly 
denies engaging in any sexual activity with Appellant , that Appellant did not use any manipulative or coercive 
means to engage sexual activity with him, that on or about May 29, 2003, Sgt. R. Latullipe called him into his office 
and stated to him that he had been after the Appellant, because he thought he was a predator, and that ifhe would 
help him out and admit to said sexual activity with Appellant, that he could help him get released from his Rider. 
Inmate Lujan continues to state therein, that he made the statements within the Declaration on his own free will 
'.vithout manipulation or coercion or by force by me, prays the court to expunge from his file said false report of 
conducting said activity '.vith Appellant, that based on said promise (by Sgt. Latullipe) and under the belief he 
would be released, under coercion and duress by Sgt. Latullipe he falsely reported that he and Appellant engaged in 
sexual activity. See Declaration in Support of Complaint, Exhibit 58 para. 1-7 p.p. 1-2. Jesse Woodruff in support 
of the Appellant on March 6, 2006, prepared and signed in front of a notary his Affidavit in support of the Appellant 
attesting that between April and May 2003 he engaged in consensual sexual activity with Appellant on his own 
accord without force, manipulation, or coercion by him, that he did not predatorize him in any fashion or manner, 
nor cause him any uncomfortable feelings, that he falsely reported that he and inmates Dwyer and Lujan had 
engaged in sexual activity between April and May 2003 without direct knowledge or personal knowledge, having 
never witnessed said sexual activity with his own two eyes, that Appellant did promise him financial gain for 
assisting him with business activity and did pay him for typing services related to such, but in no way was said 
money for payment for sexual activity between him and I, that based on formed personal relationship with me, 
knowing Appellant's behaviors and personality adamantly asserted that Appellant would not and did not sexually 
predatorize or use any manipulative coercive behaviors for sexual gratification purposes against inmates Dwyer, 
Lujan, or himself See Exhibit 57, Affidavit of Jesse Woodruff para. 1-5, p.p. 1-3. 
On May 29, 2003, Defendant Latullipe prepared a retalitorially falsely tailored predatorial sexual activity 
Disciplinary Offense Report (DOR), for reported sexual activity with inmates Woodruff, Lujan, Dwyer. See Exhibit 
7. Defendant Latulipe also on said day prepared a DOR against the Appellant charging him with Individual 
Disruptive Behavior for forming a church and religious order and allegedly employing inmates Woodruff, Dwyer 
and Lujan to create lesson plan connected to such. (See Exhibit 252) Appellant although guilty of forming said 
Church and religious order, plead not guilty to the DOR as he asserted that he created those in exercise of his First 
Amendment religious rights and neither employed inmates Dwyer or Lujan to create lesson plans. As Appellant's 
Declaration supports, IDOC prison officails, Defendants Parent and Gelalia deprived him his due process of law 
connected those DOR's. 
Inmate Josh Bradley advised Plaintiff in 2003, that inmate Dwyer masturbated in front of him and asked 
him ifhe wanted to finish. Despite said reports and incidents, in 2006 ICIO prison officials housed inmate Lujan, 
Woodruff and Swanson with him on the same unit, had the same ICIO general population privileges, including 
going to outdoor recreation with each other, that all three did often spanning a month or two. Despite said report, 
ICIO prison officials housed the Plaintiff and inmate Swanson in the same cell. On June 6, 2003, Plaintiff was 
found guilty of a DOR for engaging in predatorial sexual conduct and engaging in sexual activity with inmates 
Woodruff, Lujan and Dwyer, specifically classified as a code of disciplinary offense as 10.1. See Exhibit 7. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of DOR #03049. Attached hereto as Exhibit 58 is a true and 
correct copy of Cody Lujan's Declaration in Support of Complaint. 
On June 10, 2003, Subsequent to said DOR a Classification Committee consisting of Defendant Johnson 
convened and neither imposed Predator Point or recommended Appellant's placement or retention in Administrative 
Segregation. See Exhibit 8. 7. On July 3, 2003, Appellant appeared before Deputy Warden Defendant George 
Miller, the Deputy Chief of the Prisons, Defendant Jeffrey Zmuda and a Captain Defedant Jeffrey Henry for a 
Restrictive Housing Hearing. Deputy Warden George Miller, and Defendants Zmuda and Henry for a Restrictive 
Housing Report Hearing. See Exhibit 71. The Restrictive Housing Report of Hearing (Exhibit 71) dated July 7, 
2003, reflects that the evidence relied upon during the hearing was: A) his Disciplinary Record, B) his Attitude 
towards authority, C) his willingness and ability to live with other inmates, D) his Classification, E) his 
Documented behavior and past behavior. Under the category "Summary of Evidence & Testimony" said 
Committee wrote, "found guilty of sexual activity & Ind. Disruption behavior forming a business-· the Universal 
Church & Order of the Divine ..... ,"' said Restrictive Housing Committee recommended Plaintiff's placement in 
General Population, that under the category "Reason for Recommendation" they wrote, "Inmate was not 
threatening for sex. Sex was consentual. Inmate does not have STD at this time." See Exhibit 71. 
On July 7, 2003, Warden Gregory Fisher authorized the Appelllant's placement in General Population and 
that Defendants at that time neither recommended Appellant to be designated as a Predator or his placement in AS. 
Subsequent to that recommendation the Appellant was released into General Population and remained there until 
release on probation around January 2004. On August I 0, 2003, another Classification Committee convened and 
neither imposed Predator Point nor recommended Appellant's placement or retention in Administrative Segregation. 
See Exhibit 9. 
On September 4, 2003, President George W Bush signed the Prison Rape Elimination Act of2003 (PREA) 
establishing the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission (NPREC) (hereafter "Commission"). During the 
standards development process for the reduction of prison rape, the Commission and guidance. Among those 
comprised correctional expertise and possible stakeholders who participated and contributed in that process was Lori 
Brisbin in (Defendant in Appellant's CV-263-MHW filed on May 24, 20 IO) in the capacity of Program 
Coordinator, Prison Division, IDOC. See Appendix D of the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003. One of 
the standards adopted by the Commission is D-1-2 Disciplinary Sanctions for Inmates. This standard provides: 
"Holding inmates accountable for sexually abusing other inmates is essential to deter abuse and to demonstrate to in 
inmates and staff that the agency takes seriously its zero-tolerance policy. Unlike abusive staff, abusive inmates 
cannot simply be "fired" and removed from a correctional setting. This standard recognizes that inmate 
accountability and the likely reduction may be best achieved by using various kinds of sanctions, including not just 
punitive ones (e.g. loss of privileges) but positive interventions that may help an inmate learn to better control his or 
her own behavior (e.g. counseling, participation in group programs, or other therapeutic interventions). All 
(i) 
sanctions and interventions should send a clear message that the agency does not tolerate sexual abuse of any sort.'' 
(Quoting section Dl-2 p. 47, para. 1, Prison Rape Elimination Act of2003). This standard further provides and 
states: "When imposing disciplinary sanctions, the facility should take care to ensure that inmates are riot placed for 
prolonged periods in disciplinary segregation if the conditions in segregation have the potential to cause or 
aggravate symptoms of mental illness and/or limit access to needed mental health services." (Quoting section D 1-2 
p. 47, para. 2 PREA Act of2003). Another standard adopted by the Commission is MM-3-Ongoing medical and 
mental health care for sexual abuse victims and abusers. This standard provides requires mental health evaluations 
and treatment, when appropriate of all known abusers. The Commission also strongly recommend a number of 
topics to be included to ensure that agency and facility heads deliver the most effective sexual abuse and PREA 
training to employees, volunteers, contractors, and inmates. See Appendix B-Training Topics and Procedures. 
Among those listed is: 6. The agency's anti-retaliation policy. 
In March 2004, IDOC promulgated their Prison Rape Sexual Activity Elimination Handbook for Offenders. 
See Exhibit 983. This handbook clearly reflects the specific type of sexual activity disciplinary code offenses 
forbidden under said policy or practice. This record lists those offenses as 109, 300, 301,302,303 and 700. 
Adopted July 23, 2004, Policy Number 325, at 01.00.00 under Policy of the Department, page 1 of3, provides: 
"It is the policy of the Board of Correction that the Department of Correction establish a zero-tolerance standard 
regarding the incidence of prison rape. The Department of Correction shall develop and maintain policies and 
practices to detect, report, reduce, prevent, and punish rape and sexual activity among its offender population. It 
further reflects on page 1 of 3, 03 .00.00 References, "Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. Sec.15601, 
et seq. See Exhibit 9A. On July 23, 2004, IDOC promulgated Standard Operating Procedure 325.02.01.001, Prison 
Rape and Sexual Activity Elimination. See Exhibit 984. Among other things, this policy illustrates a step-
by-step process for reporting and investigating sexual activity and the functional and responsibilities of prison 
official's involvement in that process. See Exhibit 984 p. 1 of 17. This record more importantly sets the criteria in 
which a inmate may fall under that policy providing that when a offender has a mental health professional makes an 
offender management recommendation to the facility head, which See Exhibit 984 p. 12 of 17 at Step 13. 
{> 
On November 17, 2004, subsequent to Appellant's return to the Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC) 
for violating his probation and committing a new crime after around 3-4 months after his release, Correctional 
Officer Tammy Parker imposed Predator Point on Plaintiff's Initial Classification Score Sheet. See Exhibit 5. The 
Initial Classification Score Sheet (Exibit 51) it is completely void as to the the reason(s) why the Predator Points 
were imposed, however Appellant attest and records can substantiate is that which Defendant Parker verbally 
advised him of due to his crimes for taking a couple hostage at gunpoint and due to his 2003 sexual activity DOR 
Defendant Parker recommended that his custody level be modified to Closed. Defendant Parker, however did not 
recommend Appellant's be placed in AS, nor recommended for a Predatory Alert, nor wss he placement in 
Administrative Segregation (AS) on Predatory (PREA) status. Subsequent to said adverse classification Plaintiff 
filed numerous complaints (Exhibits 11-21, 23, 25, 26) as well as a grievance (Exhibit 24, 30) challenging the 
improperness of such. Attached hereto is a true and correct copy of Exhibits 11-21, 23-26 and 30. 
Further, Standard Operating Procedure 319.02.01.001 Version 2.01 reviewed by Pam Sonnen on August 
24, 2007 p. 6 of 20, under PRP Alert Criteria states: "The PRP alert is reserved for those offenders that pose a 
significant risk of sexual violence towards staff members or offenders to the extent that the offender must be placed 
in restrictive housing. The Chief of the Division of Prison must authorize all PRP alerts and any modification of the 
PRP alerts status. The following criteria require a referral to the Restrictive Housing Placement Committee 
(RHPC). 
• Either a criminal conviction of male rape or a finding of guilt. 
• Two or more of the following: 
---- The offender has a history of sexual crimes that include assaultive or predatory behavior. 
---· The offender has one or more code 303 disciplinary offense convictions. 
----The offender has a PSA alert and is convicted of a 303 disciplinary offense." 
('l,O) 
1 Appellant is currently without a copy of such, discovery may be necessary to procure. 
Under definitions, Standard Operating Procedure 319.02.01.001 Version 2.0,2 Division of Prisons 
Administrative Review Committee: A committee comprised as least the following: the chief of the Division of 
Prisons or designee (chairperson), a deputy attorney general; and a expert in the subject being reviewed. If the 
subject matter involves another Department Division, the Chief of that Division or will be the subject matter expert 
on the committee. The Chief of the Division of Prisons can appoint additional members to the committee. 
On December 13, 2004, Plaintiff was transferred to the Idaho Correctional Institution-Orofino (ICIO) and 
there placed in Closed Custody general population. On April 27, 2007, Defendant Sonnen approved Version 2 of 
SOP 325.02.01 .001. Under Responsibility it states: The deputy chief of the Division of Prisons or designee is 
responsible for the following: 
• Ensuring a thorough and objective investigation of incident is completed, 
• Watching for inconsistencies between the number of incidents reported through 105 and 
disciplinary reports, and the number of incidents reported on offender exit survey. 
At Section 12, Reporting Investigating Sexual Activity, Step 13 ofVersion 2 of SOP 325.02.01.001,3 it 
reflects that a Mental Health Professional, "makes an offender management recommendation to the facility head, 
which may include housing that is more restrictive for a predatory offender (two (2) or more disciplinary offense 
reports for sexual activity with different partners, evidence of coercion or manipulation, or selecting vulnerable 
partners demonstrate predatory behavior). The recommendation could include housing that is safer for a vulnerable 
offender." At Step 14. False Allegations of that SOP it provides: If it is found that an allegation of rape, sexual 
assault, or sexual activity was false, the case should be referred to law enforcement for prosecution. 
On March 10, 2009, Defendant Sonnen approved Version 3.0 of SOP 319.02.01.001. On page 6 of20 
under PREAAlert Criteria it contains the same language as Version 2.0 PREAAlert Criteria. 
On August 31, 2009, Defendant Sonnen approved Version 4.1 SOP 319, Restrictive Housing. See Exhibit 
10 A, page lof20. Attached hereto as Exhibit 11 A, is a true and correct copy of Version 4.1. page 1 of 20. This 
SOP reflects at page 5 of 20, that Long Term Restrictive Housing Placement Authorities for Administrative 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
Segregation is: Facility Head, Deputy Chief of the Division of Prisons, and Chief of the Division of Prisons, 
Director of the IDOC. See Exhibit 12 A. Attached hereto as Exhibit 12 A, is a true and correct copy of the PRP 
Alert Criteria, that the criteria were modified in part to state if, "The offender has one (1) or more sexual behavior 
disciplinary offense convictions." See Exhibit 13. Attached hereto as Exhibit 13 A, is a true and correct copy of 
Version 4.1. page 6 of 20. 
I. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
POINT 1 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND/OR ERRED IN GRI\NTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Generally, a liberty exist only if: (1) the state restricts by rule, regulation or statute when an inmate can be 
placed in restrictive confinment (removed from general population), such as the inmate being found guilty ofa 
misconduct, (see, Andeson v. Recore, 317 F.3d 194, 199 (2d Cir. 2003)("Sandin did not dispense with stautory or 
regulatory language creating an entitlement. It simply held that the regulation at issue in that case did not create a 
liberty interest because the plaintiff had not shown an atypical or significant deprivation."); Gother v. Wood, 66 
F.3d, 1097, 1100-1 (9th Cir 1995) (liberty interest created when regulation limits circumstanes under which credits 
may be taken away); see also, Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827 (9th Cir. 1997); Frazier v. Coughlin, 81 F. 3d 
313,317 (2d Cir. 1996); Gilbert v. Frazier, 931 F. 2d 1581, 1582 (7th Cir. 1991); Green v. Ferrell, 801 F. 2d 765 
(5th Cir. 1986) (punitive action implicates a liberty interest because the requirement of guilt is substantive limit on 
official discretion), and (2) that restrictive conditions impose an "atypical and significant hardship" on the inmate. 
(citing to Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). 
In Sandin, the inmate claimed that his procedural due process right to present witnesses was violated at the 
disciplinary hearing which resulted in a guilty finding and a thirty-day punitive segregation confinement. The(12) 
district court had granted summary judgment to prison officials. The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that 
(inmate could not be found guilty and placed in segregation unless the guilty finding was supported by substantia 
evidence. Conner v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463 (9th Cir. 1993). 
Sandin, not only called into question prior holding that term of one (1) year in segregation requires due 
process protctions,4 but also held that, an inmate has a liberty interest entitled to protection under the federal 
constitution when a change occurs in confinement that imposes an "atypical and significant hardship ... in relation to 
the ordinary incidents of prison life, (see, Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2301.), and "the state has granted it's inmates by 
regulation or by statute, a protected liberty interest in remaining free from that confinement or restraint. See Frazier 
Id. See also Brown v. Plaut 131 F. 3d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (inmate's placement in administrative segregation would 
violate Due Process Clause only if two conditions were met: inmate had liberty interest in avoiding that term of 
segregation, and inmate did not receive process he was due). 
When an inmate challenges his confinement in administrative or disciplinary segregation he must show 
that he has a liberty interest before he can bring a procedural due process claim Resnick v.Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 
448 (9th Cir. 2000). To do that, he must show that he is suffering ''the type of atypical, significant deprivation 
[that] might concievably create a liberty interest," as descibed in Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472,486 (1995). The 
Sandin Court relied on three factors in determining that the plaintiff possessed no liberty interest in avoiding 
disciplinary segregation: (1) whether the disciplinary segregation is essentially the same as discretionary forms of 
segregation; (2) hocw the conditions of plaintiffs confinment compare to conditions in he general population to 
determine whether palintif suffered a ''major disruption in his environment''; and (3) whether the length of the 
plaintiff's sentence was affected. Id. At 486-87. 
The Ninth Circuit held, that when prison officials determine whether a prisoner is to be placed in 
administrative segregation, the the following due process protections are applicable: (1) the prisoner be informed of 
the charges against him or the reaoson segregation is considered; (2) prison officials must hold an informal non-
4See, Whit ford V. Boglino, 63 F3d S27, S33 (8th Cir. 199S). 
present his views to the "official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation.'' 
advesary hearing within a reasonable time after the prisoner is segregated; and (3) the prisoner must be allowed 
to Touissant v. mcCarthy, 926 F. 2d 800, 803 (9th Cir.. 1990) (internal citation omitted). 
The Ninth Circuit went on to set three criteria that should be examined by a court in determining whether 
conditions are atypical and significant: (1) whether the challenged condition , ''mirrored those conditions imposed 
upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody." and thus comported with the prison's 
discetionary authority; 2) the duration of the condition, and the degree of restraint imposed; and 3) whether the 
state's action \'/ill invariably affect the duration of the prisoner's sentence." Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F. 3d 850, at 
861. 
Following suit and supporting it's earlier holding in Burnworth v. Gunderson, 5 that prisoners have a 
substantive due process right to be free from arbitrary and capricious punishment, that no iberty interest is required 
for such a claim, in 2002, the Ninth Circuit in Nonnette v. Small held that a"lack of fair hearing violates due 
process, wholly apart from the conditons of confinement and without regard to the Sandin requirements.'' 316 F. 3d 
872, 879 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Inmates should have freedom from arbitrary decision-making as a 
independant liberty interest. See, generally, Val Alstyne, Cracks in ,,''The New Property": Adjudicative Due 
Process in the Administrative state, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 447 (1997). 
In Sandin, the court recognized that the Due Process Clause of "it's own force" protects against the 
arbitrary infliction of severe deprivations upon prisoners by prison officials. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 
S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed. 2d. 418 (1995). 
These holdings are consistent with others reaffirming that, "The touchstone of due process is protection of 
the individual against arbitrary action of government," Wolff, 418 U.S., at 558. 
Further, in 2003, the Ninth Circuit held, that an inmate need not establish the existance of a liberty 
5Burnworth v. Gunderson, 179 F. 3d 771, 775 (9th Cir. 1999). 
interest if it can be shown that the segregation imposed some "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F. 3d 850, 860-1 (9th Cir. 2003), (citing to 
Sandin. 515 U.S. at 484; Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit went on to state that 
"[i]f the hardship is sufficiently significant, then the court must determine whether the procedures used to deprive 
that liberty satisfied Due Process." Ramirez, id. 
Consistent with Sandin, the Ninth Circuit in Ramirez held that, 24 months of segregation confinement 
stated cause of action. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003). In Shoats v. Horn, an inmate was 
kept in administrative segregation in the form of "permanent solitary confinement'' for a period of eight years was 
subjected to an atypical and significant hardship. Shoats v. Hom, 213 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Several other courts have found that terms ranging from 152-762 days under similar conditions as those 
discussed herein and the APSC, could, and have stated a claim. See, e.g., Sealev v. Giltner, 116 F. 3d. 47 (2d Cir. 
1997) (inmate placed in administrative segrgation level on confidential information claimed his civil rights were 
violated; court held that since plaintiff actually served 152 days in confinement, which deprived him of "all 
programming opportunities and privileges that prisoners in general population enjoyed." In Maglutta v. Samples, 
the court held, detention in solitary confinement for over 55 days no penalogical interest other than punishment 
without periodic review of case was harsh and unconstitutional. Maglutta v. Samples , 375 F. 3d 1269 (11th Cir. 
2004). See also Jackson v. Meachum, 699 F.2d 578, 584-85 (1st Cir. 1983); Morris v. Tavisono, 549 F. Supp. 291 
(D.R.I.. 1982), judment aff'd, 707 F. 2d 28 (1st Cir. 1983) (Eightth Amendmnet violated by eight and a half year 
confinement in solitary); Giano v. Selsky, 238 F. 3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that an aggregated period of 
confinement in administrative segregation of 762 days is a "sufficient departure from the ordinary incidents of 
prison life to require procedural due protections under Sandin.") quoting Colon v. Howard, 215 F. 3d 227, 231 (2d 
Cir.2000)). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held in Keenan v. Hall, a sanction may be atypical and sigificant ifit 
violates the Eighth Amendmnet or "works a major disruption" in the prisoner's environment. Keenan v. Hall, 83 
F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996), amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). In Trujillo v. Williams, the Tenth Circuit 
held, that an inmate's allegation of excessive segregation in comparison to other inmates commiting serious 
offenses supported a case for violation ofFourteeth Amendment rights. The inmate alleged he spend over 750 days 
in segregation while other similarly situated inmates spent only 180 days for the most serious offenses. Trujillo v. 
Williams, 465 F. 3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2006). 
Based upon the language in Sandin, some courts compare the time spent in segreagation to the length of the 
imposed criminal sentence in determinating whether a liberty interest exist. See, e.g., Franklin v. District of 
Columbia, 163 F. 3d 625, 633-4 (D.C. Cir. 1999). For example, ifan inmate has a sentence ofless than five years 
and is placed in segregation for six months or more, a liberty interest should be fund to exist. See, e.g., Thomas v. 
Ramos, 130 F. 3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 1999)(70 days of confinement in segregation "was obviously a relatively short 
period when one considers his 12 year prison sentence."). 
A case strikingly similar to the case before this Court, is Giano v. Kelly.6 There, the district court held that 
confinement for almost two years to administrative segregation violated due process. The court held that regulations 
relating to administrative segregation were couched in mandatory language, required a substantive predicate for 
administrative segregation confinement, and that inmates were denied virtually all meaningful contact with other 
inmates and had no access to structured activities such as job assignment, classroom instruction, group recreation, 
or religious observances. The evidence showed that for all practical purposes, the Plaintiff's life was confined to a 
cell roughly 10 feet by 10 feet, except for an hour a day when he was confined to a cell approximately twice as 
large for "recreation.'' The court held that it would be clearly atypical for a general population inmate to be 
subjected to the deprivations which plaintiff endured. 
In 2005, in Wikinson v. Austin,7 the Supreme Court resolved this issue by holding that nonpunitive 
confinement in conditions that work an atypical and significant hardship can indeed infringe on liberty interests of 
inmates triggering due process protection. In that case, as indicated above, the inmates were confined not as 
6Giano v. Kelly, 2000 WL 876855 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). 
7Wikinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005). 
punishment for violation of disciplinary rules but because of a determination that "supermax'' 'administrative 
segregation was in thier best interest and that thier presence in the general prison population posed a risk. 
Two years before this decision, the Seventh Circuit in West v. Schwebke, 8 affirmed the district court's 
denial of summary judgment to prison officials on the Plaintiffs' claim that being confined to "therapeutic 
seclusion" which includes a cell with a concrete platform for a bed, a toilet, a sink, and one hour per day outside the 
cell in shackles after they have competed thier sentence but are being held in civil confinement as "sexually violent 
persons" violates the plaintiffs due process rights. The court held that there is question of fact as to whether this 
form of onfinement can be justified on security or treatment grounds. 
While in administrative seggregation, a prisoner must receive a periodic review of his confinement. Hewitt 
v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477, 477, 103 S.Ct. 864 (1983). A review every 120 days satisfies due prcess, and the 
timing of the reviews is subject to administrative discretion. Touissant, 926 F.2d at 803. The mere recitation of 
"institutional safety" is not sufficient, periodic reviews must be "more than 'meaningless gestures''' in order to 
satsify Due Process. Touissant v. Rowland, 711 F. Supp. 536, (D. Cal. 1989) (quoting Touissant v. McCarthy, 801 
F. 2d 1080, 1102 (9th Cir. !986). Consisitent with such, there must be a record of those meetings showing the 
review was not just a pro-forma exercise, only going through the motions, and that there was meaningful 
consideration of the reasons for segregation status. See, Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 F.3d 188, 193 (2d Cir, 2001) 
(stating that a hearing for placement in administrative segregation "is not meaningful if a prisoner is given 
inadequate information about the basis of the charges against him"). A prisoner may not be confined separtely for 
gang affialiation, "unless the record contains some factual information from which prison officials can reasnably 
conclude that the information suporting [segregation] is reliable." Rojas v. Cambra, No. C 96-2990 VRW, 1997 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7610, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 1997) (unpublished) (emphasis added); see also Koch v. Lewis, 96 
F. Supp. 2d 949, 965 (D. Ariz. 2000) (noting that there must be some reliable evidence of current gang/STG 
membership before the state may impose indefinite administrative segregation), vacated as moot, Koch v. Schriro, 
399 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2005). 
8West v. Schwebke, 333 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 2003). 
In Giano v. Kelly at 49-55, the court held, that an administrative segregation committee did not give 
meaningful consideration to a prisoner's confinement in part bcause the prisoner was neither permitted to apear 
before nor submit information to the committee, and did not regulary recieve information regarding the commmittee 
recommendation. In that case, there was two main reasons for this finding. First, records of the committee meetings 
did not show that there was deliberation on evidence available after he was first confined. Second, the records of 
the committee on the specific question of whether the prisoner continued to pose a threat to the safety of the facility. 
See, also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,333, 47 L.Ed, 2d 18, 32, 96 S.Ct. 893,902 (1976) (establishing that 
the kind of meaningful consideration that satisfies due process is not satisfied by a standard set of procedures, but 
depends on the contexts in which the hearing is held). 
If an inmate establishes he has a liberty interest in not being confined in administrative segregation, due 
process requires that he be provided an oppurtunity to be heard at a meaning time and in a meaningful manner. 
See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183,202, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3023 (1984). 
Most importantly, as applied to this case, Where the prisoner serves more than one SHU term 
consecutively, the terms should be aggregated (considered together) for purposes of deciding whether the 
confinemet was atypical and significant. Giano v. Selsky, 238 F. 3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that 92 days in 
administrative segregation was atypical and significant since it followed 670 days segreagation at another prison); 
Sims v. Artuz, 230 F. 3d 14, 23-24 (2d Cir 2000) (multiple disciplinary proceedings might properly be aggregated 
for atypical and significant determination); Sealey v. Gilther, 197 F. 3d 578,587 (2d Cir. 1999) (pre-and post-
hearing confinement should both beconsidered) 
A. Plaintiff's Due Process Claims 
IDOC Standard Operating SOP 319 Version 2.0 and 3.0, IDOC Prison Rape and Sexual Activity 
Elimination Handbok for Offenders adopted and put into force in March 2004 ( See Exhibit 983 and APSC at p. 
4, para. 19), Standard Operating Procedure 325.02.01.001, Prison Rape Elimination approved and reviewed on 
August 17, 2004 by Defendant Sonnen on December 21, 2005 to which remained in effect until April 27, 2007. 
See Exhibit 984. See also, APSC at p. 4, para. 22, and IDOC Male Offender Custody Classificatiocn Manual, 
Eighth Edition. Exhibit 983 clearly identifies sexual disciplinary code offenses 109,300,301, 302, 303 and 700 as 
forbidden under said policy. See Exhibit 983, pp. 4-5. See also, APSC act p. 4 para. 20. Appellant's 2003 sexual 
activity disciplinary is classified as I 0.1. See Ecxhibit 7. See also, APSC at p. 4, para. 21. Further, evidence 
shows that all of Appellant's 2006 disciplinary offense codes invoving inmate Steele were none of those identified 
under said policy. See Exhibits 62, 145, 181 and 184. Exhibit 184, is an amendment of Exhibit 181 DOR made on 
April 27, 2006 by Defendant Driskill, pursuant the instruction cofDHO Roane (Defendant in Plaintiff's Case filed 
in the Fourth District, CV-OC-09-07216), after Appellant had filed a concern form on April 22, 2006 complaining 
to Defendant Jones about the falsifications of the charge and specifically pointing out the falsification (i.e., that he 
recieved two previous DOR for trying to pass letters to inmate Steelewithin the DOR and requested her assistance in 
dismissing the charge and later was heard on the same DOR by Defendant Roane who then denied him his Due 
Process connected to those proceedings. See, Verified Thirty (30) Paged Civil Rights Complaint (hereinafter 
"VTPCRC," , pp.18-22, para. 111-140. The record further reflects, that Appellant was neither allowed to see nor 
provided a copy of that note connected to that DOR (DOR#060168), nor provided a copy of inmate Steele note 
(which stated to the effect, I'm doing okay, I'm still trying to get moved back over there so I can get your help with 
my legal work/stuff. I still care about you and had the numbers 831 written on it which signified I love you), 
despite such being used against the Appellant to support fmding him guilty of the charge and in the possession of 
IDOC Defendants, upon his request to prison officials to be provided a copy of such to utilize in his defense (i.e , 
that inmate Steele wasn't feeling and being stalked and actively on his own free will and accord engage in 
communicating with the plaintiff which he also recieved DORs and further supported by inmate Steele's 
Declarations. See Exhibits 60 and 61), IDOC Defendant Anderson responded advising him that they were unaware 
of such, despite the record (Exhibit 145) clearly reflecting such was in her possession. See VTPCRC p. 19, 
para.I 18, 123. See also, APSC at pp. 7-8. para. 44-47, 52-54 and Exhibits 180,185,232. Exhibit 641 page 11 of 
the IDOC Male Offender Custody Classification Manual, Eighth Edition, clearly provides that : "if the offender 
has received a disciplinary report for a Class A predatory behavior (i.e., murder, sexual assault/rape, aggravated 
assault with serious injury, or possession of a firearm or bomb) during the last 15 years" that predatory point would 
be warranted. See Exhibit 641. The facts and evidence in this case show that NONE of Appellant's disciplinaries 
possess the lancguage or conduct described therein to warrant the imposition and/or reimposition and the retainment 
of predator points upon the Appellant. Nevertheless, the records before this Court clearly show that Defendants did 
validate such upon him, and refused to remove such for a number of years. See Amended Complaint, p.p. 6 
para.25-33, 81-99, ASPC, para, 100-102, 131 pp. 17-21, Exhibit 739, 
Exhibit 984 provides that when a predator offender who has "two (2) or more disciplinary offense reports 
for sexual activity with different partners demonstrate predatory behavior "a mental health professional makes an 
offender management recommendation to the facility head, which may include housing that is more restrictive for a 
predatory offender. See Exhibit 984, p.12 at Step 13. See also, APSC at pp. 4-5, para. 24-25. 
Appellant declares, while incarcerated \\ithin the IDOC, his father {Lavon Roberts) past away in 2001, 
leaving him with an inheritance of around $24,000.00. He received said amount in 2001/2002 while incarcerated at 
the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC). During the time periods of2001 through 2004 he retained a large portion of 
that inheritance on his inmate account and became acquaintance with inmates Michael Swanson, Jesse Woodruff, 
Cody Lujan, and Israel Dwyer. All said inmates and several others, were aware of his inheritance and to having, 
what in the prison world and life would be considered a substantial sum, and were interested in earning and/or 
getting some, including through extortion. On or about January 15, 2003 while incarcerated at ICC, he 
reportedthat inmate Swanson and one other inmate (whose true name is unkno-wn at the present and worked for 
Keefe, a commissary vendor business located in a ,varehouse within the ICC institution and allows general 
population inmates to package commissary for ICC and other facilities and at said time provided access to other 
inmate's account balance which is reflected on Keefe commissary order forms), said inmate discovering 
Appellant's account balance, he cohorted with inmate Swanson to extort property from him. Inmate Swanson 
advised him, that if he did not pay him money that he would falsely report that he had sexually assaulted him and 
that no one would believe him because he was a sex offender. After not cooperating to give them money, inmate 
Swanson reported that he had engaged in sexual activity with him in exchange for sex. He (Appellant) neither 
received a disciplinary connected to inmate Swanson's allegations and to the best of his knowledge nor did said 
inmates connected to that incident. Shortly thereafter he was transferred to the Idaho State Correctional Institution 
(ISCI) where he met inmates Woodruff, Lujan and Dwyer were located. On May 29, 2003, he was issued a DOR 
#03049 for reported sexual activity with inmates Woodruff, Lujan, Dwyer (See Exhibit 7) According to Defendant 
Weedon's Memorandum (Exhibit E) and Memo (Exhibit F), she reports that he "engaged in sexual activity with 
several other inmates,'' however nowhere within the DOR itself does it report that he engaged in sexual activity 
with several other inmates and specifically charges him with the three in.mates. On March 6, 2006, inmate 
Woodruff prepared and signed in front of a notary his Affidavit in support of the Appellant,9 attesting that between 
April and May 2003 he engaged in consensual sexual activity v.,ith the Plaintiff on his own accord without force, 
manipulation, or coercion by the Appellant, that the Appellant did not predatorize him in any fashion or manner, nor 
cause him any uncomfortable feelings, that he falsely reported that the Appellant and inmates Dwyer and Lujan 
had engaged in sexual activity between April and May 2003 without direct knowledge or personal knowledge, 
having never witnessed said sexual activity with his own two eyes, that the Appellant did promise him financial 
gain for assisting him with business activity, did pay him for typing services related to such, but in no way was said 
money for payment for sexual activity between him and the Appellant, that based on formed personal relationship 
with Appellant, knowing his behaviors and personality adamantly asserts that the Appellant, would not and did not 
sexually predatorize or use any manipulative coercive behaviors for sexual gratification purposes against inmates 
Dwyer, Lujan, or himself and further declared such under penalty of perjury. On March I, 2006 inmate Cody 
Lujan prepared and signed a Declaration10 under penalty of perjury in support of the Appellant stating to the effect, 
that between April and May 2003, he was falsely implicated by another inmate (Jesse Woodruff) ofperforrning 
sexual activity with the Appellant, that he adamantly denies engaging in any sexual activity with the Appellant, that 
the Appellant did not use any manipulative or coercive means to have sexual activity with him, that on or about May 
29, 2003, Sgt. R. Latullipe called him into his office and stated to him that he had been after the Appellant because 
he thought he was a predator, and that ifhe would help him out and admit to said sexual activity with the Appellant 
that he could help him get released from his Rider, that he made the statements within the Declaration on his own 
free will without manipulation or coercion or by force by the Appellant, prays the court to expunge from his file 
said false report of conducting said activity v.,ith the Appellant, that based on said promise (by Sgt. Latullipe) and 
under the belief he would be released, under coercion and duress by Sgt. Latullipe, he falsely reported that he and 
the Plaintiff engaged in sexual activity . 11 
9See Exhibit 57. 
10See, Exhibit 58, Declaration in Support of Complaint, para. 1-7, pp.1-2. 
11See Declaration in Support of Complaint, Exhibit 58 para. 1-7 pp. 1-2. 
Appellant declares, that in 2003 inmate Josh Bradley advised him that inmate Dwyer masturbated in front 
of him and requested for him to finish and that inmate Robert Romero in 2003 advised him that he and Dwyer had 
engaged in sexual conduct. See Declaration p.15, para.2. 
Appellant declares, and the record and facts in this Case will further show, that despite Appellant being 
reported by inmates Swanson, Woodruff, Lujan and Dwyer, and being found guitly of engaging in predatorial 
sexual activity with those later named inmates, in 2006 ICIO prison officials housed inmates Lujan, Woodruff and 
Swanson with him on the same unit, had the same Idaho Correctional Institution Orofino (I.CLO.) general 
population unit, with the same general population privileges, including going to outdoor recreation with each 
other, that all three often did spanning a month or two, that ICIO prison officials housed he and inmate Swanson in 
the same cell, that he recieved no DOR while there connected to these inmates. Thereafter, on May l l, 2006 
Defendants stated within thier Restrictive Housing Report of the Hearing under Summary of Evidence & 
Testimony, " Expressed intimate feelings for another inmate housed here at ICIO. Predator Points and prior history 
with individuals at ICIO that "may" 12 be ofa security/PREA issue," and reason for thier adverse 
recommendation was "PREA Concerns, Safety Concerns of the Institution.'' See Exhibit 56. 
The record and facts in this Case clearly show, that subsequent to the 2003 reports, him being found guilty 
on June 6, 2003 of engaging in sexual activity with three (3) of those four inmates, two (2) subsequent 
Classification Committees, one on June 10, 2003 involving Defendant Johnson among others, and the other 
conducted on August 13, 2003, niether imposed Predator Points or Predatory status upon him. See Exhibits 7 and 
8. 
The records and facts further reflect, that one month after Appellant was found guilty of said DOR a 
Restrictive Housing Placement Committee consisting of Defendants Henry and Zmuda convened on July 3, 2003 to 
determine his placement, relying on evidence from among other things his disciplinary record, attitude towards 
authority, willingness and ability to live with other inmates, classification and documented behavior and past 
behavior and all recommended his release to general population (GP). See Exhibit 71. Further the Record from that 
hearing clearly shows that under summary of evidence & testimony the Committee wrote, "found guilty of sexual 
activity & Ind. Disruption beha"ior forming a business- "the Universal Church & Order of the Divine." Most 
12Emphasis added by Plaintiff. 
notably this Record reflects Defendants under reason for recommendation wrote, "Inmate was not threatening for 
sex. Sex was consentual. Inmate does not have a STD at this time." See Exhibit 71. Appellant was released to 
GP thereafter and remained in GP for the most part 3 years, absent his short stint on probation and confinement in 
the jail prior to his prison return. 
In summation, the Appellant's Complaint, although not the apex of clarity, and the Records before this 
Court, suffiently support that he engaged in consentual sexual activity, (See Exhibits 57, p.1 para.I, and Exhibits 
71 and 194 ), that inmates were dipping their hands into Appellant's little pot of gold (inheritance) whom 
disgrunted and/or feeling jaded because they no longer tap the resevior, or not provided enough thereof, falsely 
reported that Appellant engaged in non-consentual sexual activity and that Defendants housed Appelant with past 
reported victims and then cried PREA and Safety Concern, that even if a legitimate safety and PREA concern did 
exist amongst those inmates, those cease, upon IDOC Defendants seperating the inmates into different facilities 
and did not justify Appellant's continued retainment in AS for five (5) years, Defendants failing to provide 
material facts to support the statements of Johanna Smith, as fully set forth above, to justify Appellant being 
continual designation and/or validation as a predator, and retaining him in Administrative Segregation for five (5) 
years under that classification, despite recommended removals of his adverse Predator Alert and assignment to 
AS. (See, e.g., Exhibits D, 880 and 194), conducting Reviews which were nothing more than meaningless gesture, 
failing to act and/or correct his improper designations, failing to show that the credibilty and realibilty was 
established with any of the reporting inmate, failing to produce sworn statements and facts to support any of the 
attached Exhibits to the Affidavit of Ms. Smith or Blades by the creators of those of those attachment documents as 
to thier truthfulness and providing documents ( e.g., Exhibits E and F) which for the most part mirror image of each 
in merely reciting prior incidents of Appellant's secxual behavior stemming from 2003-2006 and citing 
"institutional safety,'' denied him the due process of law. 
B. Plaintifrs Retaliation Claims 
"The record demonstrates that continued retalation for inmates' exercise of thier constitutional rights is a 
real threat. As found by the district court, the inmates have proven that the Department retaliated against them for 
exercising thier right to access the courts on a number of occasions 'spanning a decade' and that the retaliation 
was pursuant to a custom or policy. Despite supervisors' knowledge of this pattern, no investigation, no discipline, 
and no corective action followed. Now the Department claims that its employees will not retaliate again. The 
district court, however, found little comfort in that proclamation because no policy or mechcanism is in place to 
back up that proclaimation." Gomez v. Vernon, 255 f.3d 1118 at 112 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). "One of 
the basic functions of the privelge is to protect innocent men." Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 421 (1957). 
"Time has proved ... that blind deference to correctonal officials does no real service to them. Judicial 
concern with procedural regularity has a direct bearing upon the maintenance of institutional order; the orderly care 
with which decisions are made by the prison authority is intimately related to the level of respect with "Time has 
proved ... that blind deference to correctonal officials does no real service to them. Judicial concern with 
procedural regularities has a direct bearing upon the maintenance of institutional order; the orderly care with which 
decisions are made by the prison authority is intimately related to the level of respect with which prisoners 
regard that authority. There is nothing more corrosive to the fabric ofa public institution such as a prison than a 
feeling among those whom it contains that they are being treated unfairly." Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F. 2d 
1280, 1283 (CAI 1973). Such an institution, is, "outmoded and indeed anti-rehabilitative, for it supports the 
prevailing pattern of hostility between inmate and personnel which generates an "inmates' code" of 
noncooperation, thereby preventing the rapport necessary for a sucessful rehabilitative program. The goal is to 
reintergrate inmates into a society where men are suppose to be treated fairly by the government, not arbitrarily." 
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S., at 597 539 (1974). If there is an "inmates' code" of the prison, resulting from 
hostility to the authorities, which proscribes inmate coperation with prison officials in disciplinary proceedings, it is 
probably based upon the precieved arbitrariness of those proceedings, must be ferreted out . . '' (Qouting in part 
Wolff at 600) The "basic hurdle [to reintergation] is the concept of a prisoner as a nonperson and the jailer as an 
abosolute monach. The legal strategy to surmount this hurdle is to adopt rules ... maximizing the prisoner's 
freedom, dignity, and responsibily. More particularly, the law must respond to the substantive and procedural 
claims that prisoners may have .... " F. Cohen, The Legal Challenge to Corrections 65 1969). AS THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE noted in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S., at 484, "fair treatment ... well enhance the chance of 
rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness." 
As the above earlier discussed demonstrates, the complexities of the issues amd matters in this Case, are 
apparent. They involve, people, events and facts which span back to 2003. It involves Defendants acting pursuant 
to a custom or policy, of engaging in a persistent pattern of retaliatory misconduct, greater than that this Court saw 
in Gomez v. Vernon, and truly exemplifies the antagonism and blind-eye approach towards Idaho prisoners by thier 
keepers for exercising thier right of courts access under the First Amendment. 
Given the aforementioned,13 Apellant has layed down the foundation to support his Retaliation Claim, that 
as a result of him engaging in his First Amendment rights of assisting inmates with thier legal problems, gathering 
declarations and affidavits from inmates to file legal action challeging conditions and treatment by LC.LO. prison 
official, and filing litigation (Le. Case No. 06-49 filed in the Second District Court, Clearwater County on 
February 8, 2006. See, Exhibit 91, against LC.LO. prison officials and it's policies as being unconstitutional and 
in violation of the First Amenment, they retaliated against him by deliberately, improperly and unlawfully 
reimposing and retaining predator points on his classification, as well as PREA/PRP alert designating him and 
validating such, essentially labeling him as a predator and threat to others, resulting in his placement and retention 
in AS within the Idaho Maximum Security Instituition for five (5) years. 
The arbitrary targeting of prisoners for predator points on thier classification, PREA/PRP and/or PSA 
designation and their validation, is not an action narrowly tailored to achieve valid penological goals. In fact, said 
adverse conduct without good cause misdirects prison resources away from other institutional proceedings, e.g., 
investigating legitimate inmate security risks and threats and compromises prison security. 
Classifications decisions and transfers in retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights are 
unconstitutional. See Koch v. Lewis, 96 F. Supp. 2d 949, 955-57 (D.Ariz. 2000) (classification as a gang member 
based on "flimsy and outdated" evidence supported a claim of retaliation for legal activities), vacated as moot, 399 
F.3 1099 (9th Cir. 2005); Dannenberg v. Valadez, 338 F.3d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting jury verdict of 
$6500 compensatory and $2500 punitive damages for retaliation for assisting another prisoner with litigation; noting 
injunction requiring expungment of material related to disciplinary action. Smith v. Rowe, 761 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 
1985): Female jailhouse lawyer, who was put in segregation for over 22 months, was awarded $80,000 in punitive 
13There may be circumstances where the exercise of other rights may also support a retaliation claim. See Vance v. 
Barrett, 343 F.3d 1083, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2003). 
damages, which equaled about $119 per day. Award was upheld on appeal as it was found "neither monstrously 
excessive nor shocking." See also, Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1985); Gomez v. Vernon, 
255 F.3d 1118, 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2001). 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, for the aforementioned reasons, Appellant respectfully request this Court REVERSE the 
District Court's decisions , and to grant any other such other relief as the Court deems proper and just. 
DATED this day of lLh-~ 2012. 
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UN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LERAJJARENRA-O-KEL-L Y, ) CASE NO. 39048-2011 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) DECLARATION IN SUPPORT 
OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
V. 
KIMBERLY JONES, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
LERAJJAREANRAOKEL-LY, declares uder penalty of perjury: 
1. That I am the Appellant in the above entitled case, over the age of eighteen ( 18), years, 
am competent to make this affidavit, do it based upon personal knowledge, and if called to Court 
woud testify to and on said matters. 
2. At all times relevant hereto, Appellant (herein after refered to as "Plaintiff'' was an 
inmate in the custdy of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC). 
3. While incarcerated Appellant, engaged in consentual sexual activity. 
4. While incarcerated within the IDOC, Appellant's father (Lavon Roberts) past away in 
2001, leaving Appellant with an inheritance of around $24,000.00 in 2001/2002 while incarcerated at 
the IdahoCorrectional Center (ICC). 
5. During the time periods of 2001 through 2004, Appellant retained a large portion of that 
inheritance on his inmate account and had such when he became acquaintance with inmates Michael 
Swanson, Jesse Woodruff, Cody Lujan, and Israel Dwyer. All said inmates and several others, were 
aware of Plaintiff's large account. Those inmates were interested in earning or acquiring some of 
Plaintiff money, including through extortion . 
6. On or about January 15, 2003, while incarcerated at the Idaho Correction Center (ICC), 
Plaintiff reported that inmate Michael Swanson advised him that if he didn't pay him money he 
would report that he (Plaintiff) had sexually assaulted him and that no one would believe him 
(Plaintiff) because he (Plaintiff) was a sex offender, and that one other inmate ( whose true full name is 
unknown to him at this time) was extorting money from him. Said unknown inmate worked for Keefe 
within the ICC institution in a warehouse packing commissary for inmates. Said unknown inmate in 
that work capacity was able to view inmate's account balance which at said time reflected on Keefe 
commissary order forms. That said unknown inmate, discovered Plaintiff's account balance from that 
employment. Inmate Swanson during the course of that investigation reported that Plaintiff had 
engaged in sexual activity with him in exchange for sex, sexually pressured him. Subsequent to the 
report Plaintiff was transferred to the Idaho Security Correctional Institution (ISCI). Plaintiff recieved 
no DOR connected to said incident. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was transferred to the Idaho State 
Correctional Institution (ISCI) where he met inmates Woodruff, Lujan and Dwyer. 
7. On May 29, 2003,Plaintiff was issued a DOR #03049 for reported sexual activity with 
inmates Woodruff, Lujan, Dwyer (See Exhibit 7). On March 6, 2006, Jesse Woodruff prepared and 
signed in front of a notary his Affidavit in support of the Plaintiff attesting that between April and May 
2003 he engaged in consensual sexual activity with Plaintiff on his own accord without force, 
manipulation, or coercion by him, that he did not predatorize him in any fashion or manner, nor cause 
him any uncomfortable feelings, that he falsely reported that he and inmates Dwyer and Lujan had 
engaged in sexual activity between April and May 2003 without direct knowledge or personal 
knowledge, having never witnessed said sexual activity with his own two eyes, that Plaintiff did 
promise him financial gain for assisting him with business activity and did pay him for typing services 
related to such, but in no way was said money for payment for sexual activity between him and I, that 
based on formed personal relationship with me, knowing Plaintiff's behaviors and personality 
adamantly asserted that Plaintiff would not and did not sexually predatorize or use any manipulative 
coercive behaviors for sexual gratification purposes against inmates Dwyer, Lujan, or himself. See 
Exhibit 57, Affidavit of Jesse Woodruff para. 1-5, p.p. 1-3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 57, is a true 
and correct copy of Affidavit of Jesse Woodruff. 
8. Inmate , Cody Lujan on March 1, 2006 prepared and signed a Declaration under 
penalty of perjury in support of Plaintiff, stating to the effect, that between April and May 2003, he 
was falsely implicated by another inmate (Jesse Woodruff) of performing sexual activity with Plaintiff, 
that he adamantly denies engaging in any sexual activity with Plaintiff, that Plaintiff did not use any 
manipulative or coercive means to engage sexual activity with him, that on or about May 29, 2003, 
Sgt. R. Latullipe called him into his office and stated to him that he had been after the Plaintiff, 
because he thought he was a predator, and that if he would help him out and admit to said sexual 
activity with Plaintiff, that he could help him get released from his Rider. Inmate Lujan continues to 
state therein, that he made the statements within the Declaration on his own free will without 
manipulation or coercion or by force by me, prays the court to expunge from his file said false report 
of conducting said activity with Plaintiff, that based on said promise (by Sgt. Latullipe) and under the 
belief he would be released, under coercion and duress by Sgt. Latullipe he falsely reported that he and 
Plaintiff engaged in sexual activity. See Declaration in Support of Complaint, Exhibit 58 para. 1-7 p.p. 
1-2. Inmate Josh Bradley advised Plaintiff in 2003, that inmate Dwyer masturbated in front of him and 
asked him if he wanted to finish. Despite said reports and incidents, in 2006 ICIO prison officials 
housed inmate Lujan, Woodruff and Swanson with him on the same unit, had the same ICIO general 
population privileges, including going to outdoor recreation with each other, that all three did often 
spanning a month or two. 
9. Despite said report, ICIO prison officials housed the Plaintiff and inmate Swanson in 
the same cell. On June 6, 2003, Plaintiff was found guilty of a DOR for engaging in predatorial 
sexual conduct and engaging in sexual activity with inmates Woodruff, Lujan and Dwyer, specifically 
classified as a code of disciplinary offense as 10.1. See Exhibit 7. Attached hereto as Exhibit 7 is a 
true and correct copy of DOR #03049. Attached hereto as Exhibit 58 is a true and correct copy of 
Cody Lujan's Declaration in Support of Complaint. 
10. On June 10, 2003, Subsequent to said DOR, a Classification Committee consisting of 
Defendant Johnson convened and neither imposed Predator Point or recommended Plaintiff's 
placement or retention in Administrative Segregation. See Exhibit 8. On July 3, 2003, Appellant 
appeared before Deputy Warden George Miller, and Defendants Zmuda and Henry for a Restrictive 
Housing Report Hearing. See Exhibit 71. Attached hereto as Exhibit 71 is a true and correct copy of 
the Restrictive Housing Report of Hearing dated July 7, 2003. This record reflects that the evidence 
relied upon during the hearing was: A) Appellant's Disciplinary Record, B) Plaintiff's Attitude 
towards authority, C) Plaintiff's willingness and ability to live with other inmates, D) Plaintiff's 
Classification, E) Plaintiff's Documented behavior and past behavior. Under the category "Summary 
of Evidence & Testimony" Defendants wrote, "found guilty of sexual activity & Ind. Disruption 
behavior forming a business-'the Universal Church & Order of the Divine ..... ,"' that Defendants 
recommended Plaintiff's placement in General Population, that under the category "Reason for 
Recommendation" Defendants wrote, "Inmate was not threatening for sex. Sex was consentual. 
Inmate does not have STD at this time,"that on July 7, 2003, warden Gregory Fisher authorized the 
Plaintiff's placement in General Population and that Defendants at that time neither recommended 
Plaintiff to be designated as a Predator or his placement in AS. Subsequent to that recommendation 
the Plaintiff was released into General Population and remained there until release on probation around 
January 2004. 
11. On August 10, 2003, another Classification Committee convened and neither imposed 
Predator Point nor recommended Plaintiff's placement or retention in Administrative Segregation. See 
Exhibit 9. Attached hereto as Exhibit 9 is a true and correct copy22). On September 4, 2003, President 
George W Bush signed the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA) establishing the National 
Prison Rape Elimination Commission (NPREC) (hereafter "Commission"). During the standards 
development process for the reduction of prison rape, the Commission convened expert committees 
comprised of diverse stakeholders with expertise to provide information and guidance. Among those 
comprised correctional expertise and possible stakeholders who participated and contributed in that 
process was Defendant Brisbin in the capacity as Program Coordinator, Prison Division, IDOC. See 
Appendix D of the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003. One of the standards adopted by the 
Commission is D-1-2 Disciplinary Sanctions for Inmates. This standard provides: "Holding inmates 
accountable for sexually abusing other inmates is essential to deter abuse and to demonstrate to in 
inmates and staff that the agency takes seriously its zero-tolerance policy. Unlike abusive staff, abusive 
inmates cannot simply be "fired" and removed from a correctional setting. This standard recognizes 
that inmate accountability and the likely reduction may be best achieved by using various kinds of 
sanctions, including not just punitive ones ( e.g. loss of privileges) but positive interventions that may 
help an inmate learn to better control his or her own behavior ( e.g. counseling, participation in group 
programs, or other therapeutic interventions). All sanctions and interventions should send a clear 
message that the agency does not tolerate sexual abuse of any sort." (Quoting section Dl-2 p. 47, para. 
1, Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003). 
12. This standard further provides and states: "When imposing disciplinary sanctions, the 
facility should take care to ensure that inmates are not placed for prolonged periods in disciplinary 
segregation if the conditions in segregation have the potential to cause or aggravate symptoms of 
mental illness and/or limit access to needed mental health services." (Quoting section Dl-2 p. 47, para. 
2 PREAAct of2003). 
13. In this case, Plaintiff did and has suffered mental problems and continues to from the 
conduct of Defendants in retaining him unlawfully, including by the conditions at IMSI and failure to 
provide him with medical and mental care for his problems while in segregation. He exhausted all his 
state remedies in connection to the denial of such and can produce those records which are connected 
to a case he is preparing on those issues. 
14. Plaintiff was on probation until about October 2004 and thereafter sent back to the 
IDOC. 
15. In March 2004, IDOC promulgated their Prison Rape Sexual Activity Elimination 
Handbook for Offenders. See Exhibit 983. Attached hereto as Exhibit 983, s a true and correct copy of 
the Prison Rape Sexual Activity Elimination Handbook for Offenders pages 1, 4 and 5. 
16. This record at pages 4 and 5 reflects the specific type of sexual activity disciplinary code 
offenses forbidden under said policy or practice. This record lists those offenses as 109, 300, 
301,302,303 and 700. Adopted July 23, 2004, Policy Number 325, at 01.00.00 under Policy of the 
Department, page 1 of 3, it provides: "It is the policy of the Board of Correction that the Department 
of Correction establish a zero-tolerance standard regarding the incidence of prison rape. The 
Department of Correction shall develop and maintain policies and practices to detect, report, reduce, 
prevent, and punish rape and sexual activity among its offender population. It further reflects on page 
1 of 3, 03.00.00 References, "Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. Sec.15601, et seq. See 
Exhibit 9A. Attached hereto as Exhibit 983, is a true and correct copy Policy Number 325, at 01.00.00 
adopted July 23, 2004. On July 23, 2004, IDOC promulgated Standard Operating Procedure 
325.02.01.001, Prison Rape and Sexual Activity Elimination. See Exhibit 984. Attached hereto as 
Exhibit 984 is a true and correct copy oflDOC Standard Operating Procedure 325.02.01.001, Prison 
Rape and Sexual Activity Elimination pages 1 of 17 and 12 of 17. 
17. This record, among other things, illustrates a step-by-step process for reporting and 
investigating sexual activity and the functional and responsibilities of prison official's involvement in 
that process. See Exhibit 984 p. 1 of 17. 
18. This record more importantly sets the criteria in which a inmate may fall under that 
policy providing that when a offender has a mental health professional makes an offender management 
recommendation to the facility head, which See Exhibit 984 p. 12 of 17 at Step 13. 
19. Standard Operating Procedure 319.02.01.001 Version 2.01 reviewed by Pam Sonnen on 
August 24, 2007 p. 6 of 20, under PRP Alert Criteria states: "The PRP alert is reserved for those 
offenders that pose a significant risk of sexual violence towards staff members or offenders to the 
extent that the offender must be placed in restrictive housing. The Chief of the Division of Prison must 
authorize all PRP alerts and any modification of the PRP alerts status. The following criteria require a 
referral to the Restrictive Housing Placement Committee (RHPC). 
• Either a criminal conviction of male rape or a finding of guilt. 
• Two or more of the following: 
---- The offender has a history of sexual crimes that include assaultive or 
predatory behavior. 
---- The offender has one or more code 303 disciplinary offense convictions. 
----The offender has a PSA alert and is convicted of a 303 disciplinary offense." 
20. In this case, Plaintiff has no criminal conviction of male rape or a finding of guilt, he 
has never been found guilty of a code 303 disciplinary offense. 
21. Under definitions, Standard Operating Procedure 319.02.01.001 Version 2.0,2 Division 
of Prisons Administrative Review Committee: A committee comprised as least the following: the chief 
of the Division of Prisons or designee (chairperson), a deputy attorney general; and a expert in the 
subject being reviewed. If the subject matter involves another Department Division, the Chief of that 
Division or will be the subject matter expert on the committee. The Chief of the Division of Prisons 
Plaintiff is currently without a copy of such, discovery may be necessary to procure. 
Id. 
can appoint additional members to the committee. 
22. On November 17, 2004, Correctional Officer Tammy Parker imposed Predator Point on 
Plaintiff's Initial Classification Score Sheet. See Exhibit 5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and 
correct copy of Plaintiff's Initial Classification Score Sheet. This record reflects that it is completely 
void of the reason(s) why Predator Points were imposed. This record reflects that Plaintiff's 
recommended custody level was Close. This record reflect that Plaintiff at that time, was not 
recommended for a Predatory Alert, nor recommended for Plaintiff's placement in Administrative 
Segregation (AS) 
23. Subsequent to said adverse classification Plaintiff filed numerous complaints (Exhibits 
11-21, 23, 25, 26) as well as a grievance (Exhibit 24, 30) challenging the improperness of such. 
Attached hereto is a true and correct copy of Exhibits 11-21, 23-26 and 30. 
24. On December 13, 2004, Plaintiff was transferred to the Idaho Correctional Institution-
Orofino (ICIO) and there placed in Closed Custody general population. 
25. On April 27, 2007, Defendant Sonnen approved Version 2 of SOP 325.02.01.001. Under 
Responsibility it states: The deputy chief of the Division of Prisons or designee is responsible for the 
following: 
• Ensuring a thorough and objective investigation of incident is completed, 
• Watching for inconsistencies between the number of incidents reported through 105 and 
disciplinary reports, and the number of incidents reported on offender exit survey. 
26. At Section 12, Reporting Investigating Sexual Activity, Step 13 of Version 2 of SOP 
325.02.01.001,3 it reflects that a Mental Health Professional, "makes an offender management 
recommendation to the facility head, which may include housing that is more restrictive for a predatory 
offender (two (2) or more disciplinary offense reports for sexual activity with different partners, 
3 Id. 
evidence of coercion or manipulation, or selecting vulnerable partners demonstrate predatory 
behavior). The recommendation could include housing that is safer for a vulnerable offender." At Step 
14. False Allegations of that SOP it provides: If it is found that an allegation ofrape, sexual assault, or 
sexual activity was false, the case should be referred to law enforcement for prosecution. 
27. On March 10, 2009, Defendant Sonnen approved Version 3.0 of SOP 319.02.01.001. 
On page 6 of20 under PREAAlert Criteria it contains the same language as Version 2.0 PREAAlert 
Criteria. 
28. On August 31, 2009, Defendant Sonnen approved Version 4.1 SOP 319, Restrictive 
Housing. See Exhibit 10 A, page 1 of 20. Attached hereto as Exhibit 11 A, is a true and correct copy of 
Version 4.1. page 1 of 20. This SOP reflects at page 5 of 20, that Long Term Restrictive Housing 
Placement Authorities for Administrative Segregation is: Facility Head, Deputy Chief of the Division 
of Prisons, and Chief of the Division of Prisons, Director of the IDOC. See Exhibit 12 A. Attached 
hereto as Exhibit 12 A, is a true and correct copy of Version 4.1. page 5 of 20. 
29. This policy at page 6 of 20, at the PRP Alert Criteria, that the criteria were modified in 
part to state if, "The offender has one (1) or more sexual behavior disciplinary offense convictions." 
See Exhibit 13 A. Attached hereto as Exhibit 13 A, is a true and correct copy of Version 4.1. page 6 
of 20. 
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